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The FTC Proposed Regulation
of Prescription Drug Price Disclosure
by Retail Pharmacists
The Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 19751 con-
firmed the FTC's authority to issue trade regulation rules that "de-
fine with specificity acts or practices which are unfair or decep-
tive. ' 2 The Act further provides that such rules "may include re-
quirements prescribed for the purpose of preventing such acts or
practices."' 3 Premised on this authority, the FTC has proposed three
trade regulation rules4 designed to promote the disclosure5 of pre-
15 U.S.C.A. § 57(a) (Supp. 1975).
2 Id.
3Id.
Only the first two of these rules have been officially proposed. 40 Fed. Reg. 24031 (June
4, 1975). Rulemaking proceedings are currently in progress and are expected to be completed
by June, 1976. BNA-ATRR, No. 716, at A-3 (June 3, 1975). The proposed rules are based on
a lengthy study of the issue by the staff of the FTC. The data, analysis and conclusions of
the staff are embodied in a volume entitled PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICE DISCLOSURE: STAFF
REPORT TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (Jan. 28, 1975) [hereinafter cited as STAFF
REPORT]. Although the FTC has relied on the research of the staff in its decision to publish
the proposed rules, should be recognized that the Commission has not officially adopted
any findings or conclusions of the staff. All of the findings in the rulemaking proceeding
currently in progress will be based solely on the rulemaking record; the Staff Report will be
included as a part of this official record.
" Twenty-two states currently regulate directly the disclosure of prescription drug prices.
Ten of these states restrict disclosure by statute. See ALASKA STAT. § 08.80.420(b) (Supp.
1972); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-932(B)(3) (Supp. 1972-73); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 651.3
(West Supp. 1972); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-175A (Supp. 1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 465.23
(Supp. 1973); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39:1225(11) (1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:14-12(c) (Supp.
1972-73); N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-15-10(1)(b) (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 736.1 (1971);
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4542(a), § 17(d)(3) (1960). The remaining twelve states have
relied on state pharmacy board regulations (Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, New York, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and West Virginia).
As of November, 1975, however, three of the states (California, Kansas, and Texas) were
contemplating the total or partial repeal of disclosure prohibitions and/or the enactment of
mandatory disclosure requirements. Moreover, two states (Connecticut and Maine) have
recently removed most, though not all, state restraints. Telephone interview with Matthew
Daynard, FTC Staff Attorney, November 25, 1975, Washington, D.C.
Seven additional states restrict disclosure indirectly. Two of these (Colorado and Ohio)
require that all advertisements for prescription drugs include extensive medical information
concerning ingredients and contraindications. The remaining five states (Hawaii, Illinois,
Kentucky, Missouri, and Pennsylvania) ban the advertising of "controlled substances."
Although no state prohibits either "in-store verbal" disclosure or telephone disclosure,
only seven states (California, Hawaii, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, South Dakota, and
Washington) require either or both. And three of these states (Hawaii, Minnesota, and New
York) do not require such disclosure unless the inquirer possesses a valid prescription.
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scription drug price information by retail pharmacists. The current
limits on the availability of this information have been attributed
primarily to state statutes and state pharmacy board regulations
that prohibit or restrict disclosure and to private restraints on dis-
closure by pharmaceutical associations.' According to the FTC
these restraints have resulted in substantial and unjustifiable eco-
nomic harm to consumers. 7 The proposed rules purport to eliminate
this economic harm on the grounds that the nondisclosure of drug
prices constitutes an "unfair"-as distinguished from "decep-
tive" 8-act or practice. The proposals represent the most ambitious
recent attempt by the Commission to test its authority and enlarge
its role in the field of consumer protection.'
Seven states require "in-store posting" of prices (California, Michigan, Minnesota, New
Hampshire, New York, Texas, and Vermont).
Only fifteen states have no statutes or regulations restricting disclosure in any form
(Delaware, District of Columbia, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina,
Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming).
The private restraints derive basically from codes of ethics adopted by state and local
pharmaceutical associations at the encouragement of the two major national private pharma-
ceutical associations-the American Pharmaceutical Association (APA) and the National
Association of Retail Druggists. The codes are generally modeled after the following APA
provisions:
Section 7: A pharmacist should not agree to practice under terms or conditions which
can interfere with or impair the proper exercise of his professional judgment and skill,
or which tend to cause a deterioration of the quality of his service or which require him
to consent to unethical conduct.
Section 8: A pharmacist should not solicit professional practice by means of advertis-
ing or by methods inconsistent with his opportunity to advance his professional reputa-
tion through service to patients and to society.
Code of Ethics of the American Pharmaceutical Association, adopted September, 1969. See
also Advisory Opinion 2-70, Report of the Judicial Board to the APA House of Delegates, April
12, 1970, at 3. Codes of ethics are in effect and actively enforced in eleven of the fifteen states
having no statutory or regulatory restraints on disclosure. Nineteen of the thirty-six states
which have adopted codes of ethics in restraint of disclosure have also subscribed to the APA
Code.
I The FTC staff has estimated that the two proposed rules alone will ultimately save
drug buyers more than $200 million on the nearly $7 billion a year that are spent on prescrip-
tion drugs. See Two Pharmacist Groups Are Sued by U.S. Over 'Codes of Ethics' Barring
Drug Ads, Wall St. J., Nov. 25, 1975, at 2, col. 3 [hereinafter cited as Two Pharmacist
Groups].
I "Deceptive" may fairly be understood as the major subcategory of "unfair," but not
the exhaustive definition of that term. STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 293; see Sperry &
Hutchison v. FTC, 405 U.S. 233 (1972); FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bros., Inc., 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
The FTC has only recently indicated an interest in pr6 secuting acts or practices which are
"unfair" without also being "deceptive." But see Bristol-Myers Co., 46 F.T.C. 162 (1949).
The FTC has recently announced plans to extend its efforts with respect to the disclo-
sure of price information to include other professions as well. See, e.g., FTC Charges Illegality
in Curb on Doctors'Ads, N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1975, at 24, col. 2; FTC Plans to Study Realty,
Veterinary, Repair Industries, Wall St. J., Dec. 29, 1975, at 2, col. 2. The Drug Price Rules
thus apparently represent the beginning of a major effort against the nondisclosure of prices
among the professions. The success of the Drug Price Rules will undoubtedly influence the
[43:401
FTC Drug Price Disclosure Regulation
The substantive content of the proposed rules0 can be simply
stated. Rule I makes unlawful any private attempt to restrain phar-
macists from disclosing prices. Rule II, unlike Rule I, is specifically
designed to preempt state laws rather than merely prohibit private
restraints. This rule is addressed directly to pharmacists: it prohib-
its the failure of any pharmacist to disclose prices when such failure
is "because of or in connection with"" any state law or any private
restraint. Rule Ill, as yet unformulated but tentatively proposed by
the FTC staff, would affirmatively require pharmacists to disclose
prices by certain specified methods, 12 even when the failure to dis-
close is not due to the presence of private or governmental re-
straints.
This comment will analyze the FTC's proposed rules to deter-
mine whether the nondisclosure of drug prices may properly be re-
garded as an unfair or deceptive act or practice which the FTC is
course of this effort and the extent to which trade regulation rules will be used to achieve the
goal of price disclosure.
11 The full text of the most pertinent provisions is as follows:
Rule I: It is an unfair act or practice for any person, partnership, or corporation directly
or indirectly to prohibit, hinder, or restrict, or attempt to prohibit, hinder, or restrict,
the disclosure by any retail seller of accurate price information regarding prescription
drugs, whether such disclosure is made by means of advertisements in print media,
broadcast media, or in any other way.
Rule II: (a) It is an unfair act or practice for any retail seller to fail to disclose
adequate price information regarding prescription drugs to potential purchasers.
(b) Adequate price information is not disclosed and the requirements of this Rule are
violated if the retail seller:
(1) changes, restricts, burdens, makes or fails to make any disclosure of accurate
price information by print media, broadcast media, telephone, leaflets, mailings,
or in any other way, because of or in connection with any law, rule, regulation or
code of conduct of any non-federal legislative, executive, regulatory or licensing
entity or any other entity or person whatsoever, including but not limited to profes-
sional associations.
Declaration of Commission Intent:
(a) It is the purpose of these Rules, subject only to the requirements of federal statutes
and regulations, to allow disclosure of accurate prescription drug price information by
retail sellers to prospective purchasers and to eliminate restraints, burdens or controls
imposed by non-federal law and by private, state and local governmental action on such
disclosure by any means of communication, including but not limited to advertising
(other than exempt price disclosure requirements). It is the intent of the Commission
that these Rules shall preempt all non-federal laws, ordinances or regulations that are
repugnant to these Rules, that would in any way frustrate the purpose of these Rules,
that would in any way prevent or burden any disclosures of accurate prescription drug
price information by retail sellers to potential purchasers . . ..
40 Fed. Reg. 24031 (June 4, 1975).
"1 "The purpose of this rule is to create a duty on the part of the [pharmacist] not to
be influenced by [state laws or private restraints] in making decisions on whether to dis-
close." STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 204.
12 The methods presently under consideration include: (1) disclosure by telephone, (2)
disclosure by in-store catalogue, and (3) disclosure by in-store posting. Id. at 205-06.
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authorized13 to prohibit by requiring disclosure1 4 and, if so, whether
the FTC can displace state disclosure laws pursuant to the Federal
Trade Commission Act. 5 The comment concludes that the FTC can
present a persuasive case for requiring the disclosure of drug prices
based on a finding of unfairness apart from deception. The comment
also concludes, however, that the doctrine of Parker v. Brown will
severely limit the ability of the mandatory disclosure requirements
contained in Rules II and HI to preempt state laws prohibiting drug
price disclosure.
I. THE NONDISCLOSURE OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICES AND
THE VALIDITY OF MANDATORY DISCLOSURE RULES
A. The Doctrine of Unfairness
The Wheeler-Lea Amendments" to the original Federal Trade
Commission Act 17 extended FTC jurisdiction to include "unfair or
deceptive acts or practices" as well as "unfair methods of competi-
tion." The Amendments were expressly directed against practices
injurious to consumers, 8 regardless of the effect of such practices on
competition. Thus the FTC's claim that the nondisclosure of drug
prices is unlawful need not be supported by a showing that nondis-
closure is "anticompetitive" in the classic antitrust sense of that
term.'9 As the Supreme Court stated in Sperry & Hutchinson v.
,1 Substantive rules which an administrative agency issues pursuant to a legislative grant
of power are valid if they are: (1) constitutional, (2) issued in accordance with proper rule-
making procedure, and (3) within the granted power. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 5.03, at 299 (1958). Since the first two criteria are not at issue, this comment
focuses exclusively on the third.
" Rule I, unlike Rules II and I, involves no requirement of disclosure. However, like
Rules II and I its validity depends on whether or not the nondisclosure of drug prices can
be regarded as an "unfair or deceptive act or practice."
Is 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1970); 15 U.S.C.A. § 57(a) (Supp. 1975). A third issue-the scope
of FTC jurisdiction over retail pharmacists-is uncontroversial and therefore will not be
examined. FTC jurisdiction extends to all acts or practices "in or affecting" commerce.
Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 57a(a) (Supp. 1975). For deci-
sions affirming that the retailing of prescription drugs is "in commerce," and relying on the
"flow of commerce" rationale, see United States v. Sullivan, 333 U.S. 633 (1948), and
Northern Cal. Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. United States, 306 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 862 (1962). Since a majority of the prescription drugs sold locally in this country
are manufactured out-of-state, FTC jurisdiction extends to most retail pharmacists through-
out the country.
Pub. L. No. 447, 52 Stat. 111 (1938).
'T 38 Stat. 717 (1914).
's H.R. REP. No. 1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1937).
" Although in the past neither the FTC nor the Department of Justice has attempted
to use antitrust law to eliminate restraints on the disclosure of price information, the Depart-
ment of Justice filed its first antitrust suit against drug-price disclosure restraints on
[43:401
FTC Drug Price Disclosure Regulation
FTC,10 "the FTC does not arrogate excessive power to itself if, in
measuring a practice against the elusive, but congressionally man-
dated standard of fairness, it, like a court of equity, considers public
values beyond simply those enshrined in the letter or encompassed
in the spirit of the antitrust laws. '21
According to the FTC, the nondisclosure of drug prices is "un-
fair" because "its economic and social utility is substantially less
than its . . .disutility. ' 22 Although this broad definition arguably
conforms to the even broader Sperry language, the actual legal
meaning of "unfair" remains purposefully indeterminate.23 Despite
the fact that the definition of unfairness has been committed by
Congress to FTC discretion, the Supreme Court has on one occasion
dealt with this definitional issue.
In Sperry, the Court referred 24-seemingly with approval-to
three factors that the FTC had previously identified 25 as relevant in
determining whether a practice that is neither in violation of tradi-
tional antitrust law nor deceptive may nevertheless be regarded as
unfair: "(a) whether the practice, without necessarily having been
November 24,1975. The suit is directed only against private pharmaceutical associations and,
unlike the proposed FTC rules, does not reach state statutes or state pharmacy board regula-
tions. Two Pharmacist Groups, supra note 7, at 2.
405 U.S. 233 (1972).
21 Id. at 244.
2 STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 298. The FTC has submitted a second, supplemental
allegation to support its characterization of nondisclosure as "unfair": "[I]t [nondisclosure]
offends public policy, being basically contrary to clear national policy and not vital to achieve
important state policy goals." Id. In formulating this allegation the FTC was obviously
anticipating, and seeking to avert, the unfavorable implications of Parker v. Brown for the
preemptive power of Rules II and III, discussed infra at text accompanying notes 77-123.
Yet in so doing the FTC presupposes the very proposition that Parker militates against, that
the FTC, as a federal agency, is empowered to assess the wisdom of state laws.
3 In committing the definition of unfairness to the discretion of the FTC, the Senate
Report on the original Federal Trade Commission Act stated: "The Committee gave careful
consideration to the question as to whether it would attempt to define the many and variable
unfair practices which prevail in commerce and to forbid their continuance or whether it
would, by a general declaration condemning unfair practices, leave it to the Commission to
determine what practices were unfair. It concluded that the latter course would be better
." S. REP. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914). See also Section 5 of the FTCA-
Unfairness to Consumers, 1972 Wis. L. Rav. 1071; Hearings on S. 3744 Before the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1936) (Wheeler-Lea
Amendments).
The status of nondisclosure as an "unfair act or practice" is determined exclusively by
whether or not it is "unfair." The argument that nondisclosure is not an "act or practice,"
since it constitutes mere inaction and is therefore beyond the scope of the Federal Trade
Commission Act cannot be supported.
24 405 U.S. at 244-45 n.5.
Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation Rule 408, 29 Fed. Reg. 8325, 8355
(1964) (Trade Regulation Rule for the prevention of unfair or deceptive advertising and
labelling of cigarettes).
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previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been
established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise; (b) whether
it is immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous; (c) whether it
causes a substantial injury to consumers (or competitors or other
businessmen). '"26 Of these factors, only the first and third are
claimed by the FTC to be satisfied by the nondisclosure of drug
prices.2 As for the second factor, the FTC has not claimed, and
probably could not readily demonstrate, that nondisclosure is
"immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous." Since the FTC
does not contend that nondisclosure is "immoral, unethical,
oppressive or unscrupulous," it is necessary to determine whether
the three factors mentioned in Sperry must be satisfied conjunc-
tively in order to make a showing of unfairness. 29
The Sperry Court addressed this issue in response to an argu-
ment by the defendant that the FTC had stated, in a later portion
of the same statement quoted above,"0 that the mere showing of
substantial injury to consumers was insufficient without a concur-
rent showing of the first and second factors. The FTC had actually
asserted that "[tihe wide variety of decisions interpreting the elu-
sive concept of unfairness at least makes clear that a method of
selling violates [the Federal Trade Commission Act] if it is exploi-
tive or inequitable and if, in addition to being morally objectiona-
ble, it is seriously detrimental to consumers .... "I'
The Sperry Court was unsympathetic to the defendant's inter-
pretation of the FTC statement and indicated that the words "at
least" admit the possibility that "substantial injury" alone is suffi-
cient to prove unfairness.12 Thus the Court, in rebutting the defen-
dant's argument, might plausibly be said to have recognized that
26 Id.
" STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 298.
n As applied to the trade practice of drug-price nondisclosure, the second factor would
seem to require a showing of unscrupulous intention on the part of nondisclosing retail
pharmacists. Such a showing would be considerably burdensome and difficult to determine
factually. Furthermore, a showing of requirement (b) would be particularly unlikely in the
case of Rule II, which by definition proscribes as unfair only those instances of nondisclosure
resulting from deference to state law or submission to private restraints-not autonomous
unscrupulous intentions. Cf. Comment, Psychological Advertising. A New Area of FTC
Regulation, 1972 Wis. L. REv. 1097, 1108.
" Recognition of Sperry in the legislative history of the FTC Improvement Act was
confined to a brief statement submitted before a House subcommittee by Sears, Roebuck &
Co. Hearings on H.R. 20 and H.R. 5021 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of
the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 93-17, at
346 (1973).
"0 See note 25 supra.
3, Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 25 (emphasis added).
32 405 U.S. 233, 245 (1972).
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the FTC had not committed itself to the view that all three require-
ments discussed in Sperry must be met. Unfortunately the Court in
Sperry did not analyze this issue further and thus left open the
question whether "substantial injury" alone satisfies the test for
unfairness. The Court may well have thought that an explicit, for-
mulaic articulation of the criteria for unfairness was unnecessary to
its decision and inconsistent with the legislative intent regarding
the concept.33 In addition, the Court's silence on this question can
well be interpreted as a willingness to afford the FTC the traditional
judicial respect for an administrative agency's interpretation of its
own statute.
3 4
The likelihood of judicial acceptance of a characterization of
nondisclosure of drug prices as an unfair act or practice cannot be
determined on the basis of existing judicial precedents. Even if, as
the Sperry Court came close to implying, the substantial injury
requirement is sufficient to establish unfairness, the problem re-
mains that substantial injury is itself an inexact concept. In this
situation of uncertainty, the standard of review which a reviewing
court applies to the FTC determination assumes critical import-
ance.
While the articulation of a definition of unfairness is a matter
committed by Congress to the FTC's discretion,3 it is unclear what
weight a reviewing court will grant the FTC's exercise of such discre-
tion. To the extent that the FTC's expertise is respected, or that
"substantial injury" is viewed as a question of fact, a court will limit
its review to the "reasonable basis" test." Given the controversial
nature of the factual questions involved and the conspicuous thor-
oughness of the FTC's factual investigation,37 the FTC can be ex-
pected to meet the reasonable basis test. To the extent that unfair-
ness is considered a question of law, a reviewing court will substitute
its judgment for that of the FTC. A court would most likely uphold
" See note 23 supra.
" FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966); cf. Note, Unfairness Without Deception:
Recent Positions of the Federal Trade Commission, 5 LOYOLA U.L.J. 537, 546 (1974).
-" See note 23 supra.
39 4 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 30.14, at 268 (1958). The most decisive
articulated factor that guides the exercise of judicial discretion in choosing between substitu-
tion of judgment and use of the reasonable basis test is the comparative qualifications of court
and agency to decide the particular issue. Many "mixed" issues of law and fact, however,
involve neither judicial nor administrative expertise as a special factor. Id. The issue of
"unfairness" is exemplary.
11 See STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 321-472. The purely factual determination involved
in ascertaining "unfairness" is beyond the scope of this comment. See generally Benham, The
Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J. LAw & EcoN. 337 (1972); Stigler, The
Economics of Information, 7 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961).
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the FTC in this situation as well. The few decisions that have dealt
with the nondisclosure of drug price information, in the context of
suits challenging the constitutionality of state disclosure prohibi-
tions, have been predominantly consistent with the FTC position. 8
B. The Disclosure Requirement
The FTC has broad discretion to fashion remedies for violations
of the Federal Trade Commission Act.39 If the nondisclosure of pre-
scription drug prices can be characterized as an unfair act or prac-
tice, the FTC should be able to order any remedy that bears "a
reasonable relationship to the unlawful practice."4
In recent years the FTC has frequently ordered, with judicial
approval, the affirmative disclosure of information about retail
products. But generally it has done so only by either of two methods:
(1) "affirmative disclosure, 4 1 whereby the party is prohibited from
advertising in the future unless such future advertisements contain
a self-derogatory disclosure as specified by the FTC; and (2)
"corrective advertising, ' 4 whereby the party is required to disclose
Is See, e.g., Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, Inc. v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 373 F.
Supp. 683 (E.D. Va. 1974), prob. juris. noted, 420 U.S. 971 (1975); Florida Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Webb's City, Inc., 219 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 1969); Maryland Bd. of Pharmacy v. Say-A-Lot,
Inc., 270 Md. 103, 311 A.2d 242 (1973); Oregon Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. Peterson,
244 Ore. 116, 415 P.2d 21 (1966). Contra, Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery, 305 F. Supp. 821
(W.D. Va. 1969); Supermarkets Gen. Corp. v. Sills, 93 N.J. Super. 326, 225 A.2d 728 (Ch.
1966).
3' "The Commission is the expert body to determine what remedy is necessary to elimi-
nate the unfair or deceptive trade practices which have been disclosed. It has wide latitude
for judgment . . . ." Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 612-13 (1946). See also Arthur
Murray Studio of Wash., Inc. v. FTC; 458 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1972); Tashof v. FTC, 437 F.2d
707 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Consumers Products of America, Inc. v. FTC, 400 F.2d 930 (3d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1088 (1969). Judicial discussions of the issue of remedy are
limited to the context of cease and desist orders fashioned under section 5(b) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act or section 11(b) of the Clayton Act, but no principled reason exists
to doubt their applicability where the remedy takes the form of a trade regulation rule. See
120 CONG. REC. 12059-60 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1974).
, Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 612-13 (1946).
4 See, e.g., Tashof v. FTC, 437 F.2d 707 (D.C. Cir. 1970); P.F. Collier & Son Corp. v.
FTC, 427 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1970); All-State Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 423 F.2d 423 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 828 (1970); Haskelite Mfg. Co: v. FTC, 127 F.2d 765 (7th Cir. 1942); Bio-
chemic Research Foundation, 3 TRADE REG. REP. 20,463 (FTC 1973); Procter & Gamble Co.,
79 F.T.C. 589 [1970-73 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 19,774 (1971); Arlington Imports,
Inc., 77 F.T.C. 1109 [1970-73 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 19,322 (F.T.C. 1970).
,2 Corrective advertising is the more recent and more controversial type of FTC dis-
closure remedy. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398 [1970-73 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REG. REP. 20,112, aff'd, 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1972); Campbell Soup Co., 77 F.T.C. 664
[1967-70 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 19,261 (1970). See generally Lemker, Souped
Up Affirmative Disclosure Orders of the Federal Trade Commission, 4 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
180 (1970); Likoff, Consumer Protection, 1973/4 ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 701 (1974).
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certain information in order to counteract the effects of past decep-
tion. Neither method, however, has been utilized without a prior
finding of "deception. 4 3 Since the remedy of disclosure has been
examined only in the context of deceptive acts or practices, a gen-
eral deference to the FTC's broad discretion in fashioning remedies
is insufficient to sustain the disclosure requirements in proposed
Rules II and III which are premised solely on unfairness. This sec-
tion of the comment will discuss the issue of whether the nondis-
closure of drug price information is deceptive, and whether disclo-
sure remedies can be utilized absent a finding of deception.
1. Nondisclosure as Deception. In an early case dealing with
the nondisclosure of retail product information, Alberty v. FTC,44
the respondent had advertised a drug product as effective in reliev-
ing lassitude arising from one particular cause-iron deficiency. The
FTC declared this advertisement deceptive and ordered the respon-
dent to disclose in all future advertisements the additional fact that
lassitude was caused less frequently by iron deficiency than by other
causes against which the product was ineffective. 5 The court held
that the FTC could not order this disclosure. The ambiguity here,
however, is whether the court denied the order merely because the
FTC failed to make a showing of deception; or more broadly, be-
cause no deception can possibly be shown where, as here, the
advertisers "state accurately the limited benefits of their product
[but fail merely] . . . to call attention to what their product will
not do.""0 The latter interpretation would suggest that disclosure
cannot be required where the absence of information is not decep-
tive, even if such information would be useful to consumers. As the
court stated:
[w]e think that the negative function of preventing falsity and
the affirmative function of requiring or encouraging additional
interesting and perhaps useful information which is not essen-
tial to prevent falsity, are two different functions. . . . Con-
gress gave the Commission the full of the former but did not
give it the latter. 41
This language suggests that the FTC may not require disclosure of
drug prices unless the nondisclosure of such prices involves a decep-
tion on the part of retail pharmacists-a deception which the FTC
11 See Likoff, Consumer Protection, supra note 42, at 701.
" 182 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
,' Id. at 38-39.
" Id. at 39.
47 Id.
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has not alleged. 8 Alberty might be distinguishable, however, in that
the court in that case was particularly concerned that granting the
FTC broad authority to require self-derogatory disclosures by adver-
tisers would have an adverse impact on the general marketing of
products. The disclosure of drug price information, on the other
hand, is not self-derogatory; and its impact on the marketing of
drugs would, according to the FTC, be beneficial.49
Subsequent decisions have consistently affirmed FTC orders
compelling affirmative disclosure of self-derogatory information in
factual situations very similar to Alberty, attributing to Alberty
only the narrow holding that no adequate showing of deception was
made in that case (but that given such showing the FTC could
compel the disclosure)." Although the current judicial trend is not
clearly in favor of the "informative function"-which Alberty re-
garded as beyond FTC authority-the judicially acceptable defini-
tion of "deception" has been increasingly liberalized, and the FTC
would not necessarily be unable to so characterize the nondisclosure
of drug prices. It might be argued that nondisclosure "deceives"
consumers into assuming that drug prices do not vary substantially
from one pharmacy to another, and that consumers are thereby
injured. Thus nondisclosure constitutes a "deceptive act or prac-
tice." The major deficiency in this argument is that the causal
relationship between nondisclosure by pharmacists and consumer
misconception is not entirely clear. On the other hand, even if phar-
macists can only be held nominally responsible for the misconcep-
tion, that may be sufficient, inasmuch as the courts have typically
taken an exceedingly patronizing view of consumer mentality and
the FTC's role in protecting against consumer errors. As the courts
have repeatedly stated, the FTC was created for the protection of
"the ignorant, the unthinking, and the credulous."'51
Although "deception" is seemingly a more improbable legal
theory than "unfairness" for justifying the FTC's power to require
disclosure of drug prices, it is not entirely without precedential sup-
port. These precedents 2 suggest, at minimum, that retailers may be
" See note 10 supra (text of proposed rules).
4 STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 2.
See J.B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967); Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879
(9th Cir. 1960); Keele Hair & Scalp Specialists, Inc. v. FTC, 275 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1960). Only
one court, in Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1960), has specifically disapproved Alberty's
broad rejection of the "informative function" with respect to F'C remedies. 285 F.2d at 900-
01.
" E.g., Nirsek Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1960); Harsam Distrib., Inc.
v. FTC, 263 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1959); Florence Mfg. Co. v. J.C. Dowd, 178 F. 73 (2d Cir. 1910).
11 Cases cited note 51 supra.
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held responsible by the FTC for deceptive acts or practices even
though the retailers are not wholly to blame for the consumers'
misconception. This proposition augurs well for the FTC stance
against retail pharmacists. Most of these cases, admittedly, also
involve extant affirmative acts of disclosure and not merely, as in
the case of pharmacists, "pure" failure to disclose. But this distinc-
tion is not always crucial. 3
2. Disclosure as a Remedy for Unfairness. Although the char-
acterization of the nondisclosure of drug prices as deceptive is possi-
ble, the more tenable characterization and the one being advanced
by the FTC is as an "unfair act or practice." An unfairness rationale
for mandatory disclosure would unquestionably be novel to the
theory, but not to the apparent policy concern, to which the courts
have heretofore subscribed in permitting the FTC to require disclo-
sure of material facts about retail products. This policy concern is
no less broad, or less flexible, than that stated by Judge Learned
Hand in FTC v. Standard Education Society:54 "[The Commis-
sion's] duty. . . is to discover and make explicit those unexpressed
standards of fair dealing which the conscience of the community
may progressively develop."55 With respect to this underlying policy
concern, unfairness and deception are sufficiently similar to warrant
similar remedies.
The FTC has employed disclosure as a remedy through rule-
making in the past. 6 Particularly relevant in this regard is the
33 The cases support the general proposition that nondisclosure of material facts may
constitute deception even in the absence of affirmative disclosure, but do not specifically
support the additional proposition that such nondisclosure constitutes deception even if the
alleged deceiver is not wholly to blame, either morally or causally, for the deception. See,
e.g., Bantam Books, Inc. v. FTC, 275 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1960); Mohawk Ref. Corp. v. FTC,
263 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1959); American Tack Co. v. FTC, 211 F.2d 239 (2d Cir. 1954) (per
curiam); L. Heller & Son, Inc. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1951); Segal v. FTC, 142 F.2d
255 (2d Cir. 1944). See also Dorfman v. FTC, 144 F.2d 737 (8th Cir. 1944).
" 86 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1936), rev'd on other grounds, 302 U.S. 112 (1937).
5 Id. at 696.
51 Promulgated trade regulation rules which have required affirmative disclosures are
listed by title as follows, in reverse chronological order of effective date: Deceptive Advertising
and Labeling as to Length of Extension Ladders, 16 C.F.R. § 418 (1970); Games of Chance
in the Food Retailing and Gasoline Industries, 16 C.F.R. § 419 (1972); Failure to Disclose the
Hazards of Inhaling Quick-Freeze Aerosol Spray Products Designed for the Frosting of Bever-
age Glasses, 16 C.F.R. § 417 (1969); Failure to Disclose that Skin Irritation May Result from
Washing and Handling Glass Fiber Curtains and Drapery Fabrics, 16 C.F.R. § 413 (1968);
Deceptive Advertising and Labeling as to Size of Tablecloths and Related Products, 16 C.F.R.
§ 404 (1965); Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Previously Used Lubricating Oil, 16
C.F.R. § 406 (1972); Misbranding and Deception as to Leather Content of Waist Belts, 16
C.F.R. § 405 (1972); Deception as to Nonprismatic and Partially Prismatic Instruments Being
Prismatic Binoculars, 16 C.F.R. § 402 (1964); Advertising and Labeling of Sleeping Bags as
to Size, 16 C.F.R. § 400 (1972).
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FTC's Trade Regulation Rule Relating to the Care Labeling of Tex-
tile Products, 7 which provides a substantial legal foundation for
FTC authority to require disclosure of facts. The rule requires man-
ufacturers and marketers of textile products to label their products
with clear instructions for the maintenance of the product's utility
and appearance. The rule is premised on the assumptions that lack
of such information may result in impairment of the product's util-
ity or appearance and, since consumers are not apprised of the
necessary procedures for maintenance, they are precluded from
choosing rationally among competing products. Thus this rule, like
proposed Rules II and Ill, requires disclosure of material informa-
tion about a retail product.
The Textile Labeling Rule is superficially distinguishable from
the Drug Price Rules in two related respects. First, a concern behind
the Textile Rule was that the products in question would, due to no
fault of the purchaser, be impaired after purchase; the Drug Price
Rules, in contrast, are not relevant to the continued quality of the
product after purchase. Second, the Federal Register records on the
Textile Rule indicate that consumers were being "misled and de-
ceived" about what maintenance procedures were necessary. There-
fore, the Textile Rule is distinguishable on the grounds that it was
designed to remedy a situation where the consumer is uninformed
at the time of purchase about an essential attribute of the product
purchased, whereas in the prescription drug situation the consumer
is not uninformed in this way. These distinctions do not suggest,
however, that drug price nondisclosure is inherently less worthy of
regulation. Rather, the Textile Rule and the Drug Price Rules can
be characterized more broadly: both are concerned chiefly with
helping the consumer to purchase rationally, and both are ad-
dressed to the danger that consumers may suffer an economic detri-
ment due to the absence of information.
Substantially the same public interest rationale that underlies
the Textile and Drug Price Rules has received express congressional
sanction. Although congressional authority, based as it is on the
commerce clause, is more extensive than FTC authority to proscribe
"unfair acts or practices," various measures that Congress has
adopted suggest that the mandatory disclosure requirement in
Rules II and III is largely consistent with existing congressional
policy. The Automobile Information Disclosure Act,58 for example,
51 34 Fed. Reg. 17,776 (1969). See also The Posting of Research Ratings on Gasoline
Dispensing Pumps, 34 Fed. Reg. 12,449 (1969).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1231-33 (1970).
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provides that automobile manufacturers must affix price informa-
tion to the windshield of all cars distributed by them in commerce.
In United States v. Cummings,59 the only case in which that Act was
challenged, 0 the court expressly confirmed that the price disclosure
requirement was a valid, exercise of congressional power. Admit-
tedly, two differences between this Act and the Drug Price Rules
detract from the Act's precedential value. The requirement in the
Automobile Act was imposed on manufacturers, not retailers as in
the FTC rules. The pecuniary burden of disclosure would be consid-
erably less serious for manufacturers and therefore a less significant
factor to be considered by Congress. Also, the price-packing abuse
among automobile dealers was found to be much more extensive
than any alleged price-packing among retail pharmacists. This fac-
tor seemed to weigh quite heavily in the congressional reports.'
These distinctions should not obscure the more central fact that
Congress has seen fit to require businesses to disclose facts in order
to aid consumers, enhance competition, and deter consumer exploi-
tation. Another significant example of this policy is the Truth in
Lending Act,"2 which requires disclosure of credit terms by crediting
institutions and retail lenders "so that the consumer will be able to
compare more readily the various credit terms available to him.6 3
Like the Automobile Act, the Lending Act is distinguishable from
the FTC rules. First, Congress, in passing the Lending Act, was
likely motivated in part by the particular unfairness of imposing a
future obligation on consumers (i.e., the repayment of the credit
borrowed) without making clear the conditions of that obligation.
In contrast, the nondisclosure of drug prices imposes no such future
obligation: consumers, in purchasing drugs, are completely aware of
the transaction to which they are consenting. Second, Congress
seems to have attributed the unavailability of credit terms not
merely to the "inconvenience" of obtaining such information (as in
the case of drug price information 4), but rather to the inability of
lay consumers to make sophisticated computations on the basis of
the inadequate data furnished by the creditors or to the literal im-
possibility of computing rates on the basis of such limited data.
Notwithstanding these distinctions, the Lending Act testifies to the
legal soundness of the FTC disclosure remedy, and not merely be-
" 184 F. Supp. 18 (W.D. Pa. 1960).
0 The challenge was solely on jurisdictional grounds.
" U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2902 (1958).
12 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970).
3Id.
" STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 16.
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cause the Act was, like the rules, designed to promote price compar-
ison and protect the consumer. More notably, the Lending Act was
specifically intended to remedy not only the deceptive disclosure of
credit terms but also, like the FTC rules, "pure" nondisclosure
without deception. 5
II. FTC PREEMPTION OF STATE DISCLOSURE LAWS
A. Displacement by Administrative Rules
Even though the nondisclosure of prescription drug prices can
likely be remedied, if unfair, by rules requiring disclosure, Rules II
and I are not valid unless, in addition, the FTC has authority to
preempt state laws that restrict such disclosure. The rules represent
the FTC's first nationwide attempt to displace state law.6
Under the judicial doctrine of federal preemption, as founded
on the supremacy clause, 7 a valid federal law will displace any
inconsistent state laws. The doctrine applies no less legitimately to
valid administrative regulations than to statutes enacted by Con-
gress, since "regulations promulgated under specific statutory au-
See note 62 supra.
U A proposed amendment to the Federal Trade Commission Act, which would have
rendered all state restrictions on prescription drug price disclosure "unfair acts or practices,"
was introduced in the House of Representatives during the Ninety-second Congress, but not
passed. I.R. 5938, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). See also H.R. 5736, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)
(a later version of H.R. 5938, also unpassed).
Note further that state disclosure laws, particularly statutes as distinguished from state
pharmacy board regulations, are currently being challenged on constitutional grounds. See
cases cited note 38 supra. These challenges are typically based on the argument that the
statutes constitute an improper exercise of the police power. See Comment, Regulation of
Prescription Drug Discount Advertising, 24 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 299 (1967); 37 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 617 (1971). A more curious theory of unconstitutionality was upheld in Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc. v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 373 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Va. 1974), prob.
juris. noted, 420 U.S. 971 (1975), where a three-judge district court held that a Virginia
statute violated plaintiffs-consumers' first amendment "right to receive" (inferred from that
amendment's prohibition against abridgement of freedom of speech). The defendant was
granted appeal to the Supreme Court, where decision is now pending. Contra, Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). For further discussion of first amendment challenges, see
Comment, The Right to Receive and the Commercial Speech Doctrine: New Constitutional
Considerations, 63 GEo. L.J. 775 (1975); Comment, The Constitutionality of a Statute Pro-
hibiting Advertising of Prescription Drug Prices, 28 OKLA. L. REv. 350 (1975).
State disclosure laws have previously undergone slight displacement by the Federal Price
Commission. Under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (1970), the
Commission promulgated regulations requiring retail pharmacists having total annual sales
in excess of $200,000 to post the base prices of the 40 best-selling drugs. 6 C.F.R. § 300.5
(1972), 36 Fed. Reg. 23974 (1971). The Commission has ruled that state laws prohibiting
posting of the sort required by the federal regulations were unenforceable under the suprem-
acy clause. Economic Controls, Stabilization Program Guideline, CCH T 537.25 (1973).
" U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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thority [have, like statutes,] the force of law upon promulgation,
and so long as they are confined within the limits of statutory dele-
gation, their force will be recognized by the courts." Accordingly,
the Supreme Court has provided substantial support for the propo-
sition that legislative rules validly adopted by a federal agency can
render inconsistent state laws unenforceable. 9
Thus the question of FTC authority to displace state law
through proposed Rules II and I involves two additional issues:
whether the rules are sufficiently inconsistent with state disclosure
laws to compel displacement, and if so, whether FTC rules that
purport to displace state law are within the FTC's statutory grant
of power or are barred by the doctrine of Parker v. Brown.
B. Inconsistency and Mechanical Repugnancy
A broad test is generally invoked to determine the preemptive
effect to be accorded a federal administrative regulation. In Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, the Supreme Court held that if
an agency's enabling statute evinces no clear congressional intent
to displace the state law in question, then displacement is permissi-
ble only if simultaneous compliance with both the federal regulation
and the state law is "physically impossible."7 Applying this so-
called "mechanical repugnancy" standard, the Court in Florida
Lime ruled that a federal marketing order, issued by the Depart-
" United States v. Jones, 204 F.2d 745, 753 (7th Cir. 1953); accord, United States v.
Mersky, 361 U.S. 431,437-38 (1960); Doran v. United States, 304 F. Supp. 1162, 1169 (D.P.R.
1969); Stork v. United States, 278 F. Supp. 869, 875-76 (E.D. Wis. 1968); K. DAviS, ADMINiS-
TRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.03 (1958); see cases cited note 69 infra. The power of "legislative"
rules to displace state law is not subverted by a determination that the agency's enabling
statute would not preempt state laws by its own force (i.e., in the absence of such rules). Thus
displacement by the FTC Rules is not at odds with Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery, 305 F.
Supp. 821 (W.D. Va. 1969), where a district court held that the Federal Trade Commission
Act evinces no specific congressional design to preempt state regulation of prescription drug
price disclosure, and no "actual conflict" necessitating such preemption.
" Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962); Public Utilities Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S.
534 (1958); Leslie v. Arkansas, 352 U.S. 187 (1956). See also Head v. New Mexico Bd. of
Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424 (1963).
The preemptive force of Trade Regulation Rules is not addressed in the Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act, and is largely ignored in the legislative history. The principal
exception is a prepared statement before a House Subcommittee by a spokesman for the
Consumer Bankers Association. Hearings on H.R. 20 and H.R. 5021 Before the Subcomm.
on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 93-17, at 207 (1973) (statements of Walter W. Vaughn). There thus
exists no substantial indication that Congress was specifically cognizant that the rules sanc-
tioned by the Act could or should preempt state laws. The reports of both the House and
Senate are silent in this respect.
70 373 U.S. 132, 143 (1962).
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ment of Agriculture pursuant to a statute, could not displace a
California statute which excluded from California markets certain
avocados which the federal order certified to be marketable.7 1
The FTC is technically correct in concluding that Florida Lime
supports the preemptive power of Rules II and BI, but for the wrong
reason. The FTC argues that Rule II is mechanically repugnant to
state disclosure laws because it is impossible for pharmacists to
disclose prices and not take account of state laws, and at the same
time obey state laws prohibiting disclosure. This application of the
test mistakenly assumes that Rule II requires pharmacists to "dis-
close prices and not take account of state laws. ' 2 What the rule
actually requires is that pharmacists either disclose prices or not
take account of state laws. Thus the FTC ignores the possibility that
a pharmacist could indeed comply with both Rule II and state law
by simply refraining from disclosure without doing so in deference
to state law or private restraints. Furthermore, even Rule III, requir-
ing disclosure by certain specified methods regardless of the absence
of restraints, would not satisfy the physical impossibility test when
evaluated in conjunction with many state disclosure laws. This is
because many states, while permitting disclosure by those methods
which Rule III would require,73 prohibit general media advertising;
Rule HI, in contrast, will not be formulated so as to require media
advertising, for the FTC anticipates that such a requirement might
lead to excessive commercialization.74 Therefore Rule III, and those
state laws which prohibit media advertising while permitting other
methods of disclosure, can be simultaneously satisfied if the phar-
macist discloses prices by such methods yet refrains from media
advertising.
The mechanical repugnancy test does not represent an obstacle
to the preemptive power of the proposed rules. The Florida Lime
Court, in announcing the test, was concerned with two essential
points: (1) "whether both [the federal and the state] regulations
11 The Court concluded that "physical impossibility" obtained only "if, for example, the
federal orders forbade the picking and marketing of any avocado testing more than 7% oil,
while the California test excluded from the state any avocado measuring less than 8%
oil .. " Id.; cf. Double-Eagle Lubricants, Inc. v. Texas, 248 F. Supp. 515 (N.D. Tex.),
appeal dismissed, 384 U.S. 434 (1966); Royal Oil Corp. v. FTC, 262 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1959).
As used by the courts, physical impossibility is a slightly exaggerated term, because it presup-
poses that the would-be law abider, faced with mechanically repugnant laws, will continue
in his present business capacity rather than abandon his business in order to avoid the
conflict.
72 STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 504.
73 See note 5 supra.
, STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 508.
[43:401
FTC Drug Price Disclosure Regulation
can be enforced without impairing the federal superintendence of
the field";75 and (2) whether the state regulation "stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress."" With respect to both of these con-
cerns, displacement by the proposed FTC rules seems favored-in
fact, inevitable-assuming the validity of the rules otherwise. Any
pharmacist who discloses prices and is prosecuted under state law
may thereupon invoke either rule as a defense. Since either rule will
have required the pharmacist to disclose prices rather than heed
state law, the state law will fall. The FTC rules, if valid otherwise,
thus displace state law inherently, and any further question about
their power to displace is illogical. Unlike the FTC rules, the federal
regulations in Florida Lime did not inherently displace state laws.
C. The Relevance of Parker v. Brown
The second and more critical issue is whether the FTC has
statutory authority to displace state law. The doctrine of Parker v.
Brown" has been held to limit the scope of antitrust laws, including
by implication the Federal Trade Commission Act, when directed
against "state action." 8 The doctrine poses a serious and in all
likelihood insuperable obstacle to the preemptive power of the pro-
posed FTC Drug Price Rules.
Parker involved an action by an individual raisin producer to
enjoin the California Director of Agriculture and other state officials
from instituting a raisin proration marketing program as required
by a state statute. Plaintiff claimed that the state program ob-
structed competition and was invalid under the Sherman Act. The
Court, in upholding the state program, held that the action taken
to install the program was not within the scope of the Sherman Act.
The elusive rationale for this decision rests mainly on two levels of
generality. First and more specifically, the Court concluded, after
reviewing the Act's legislative history, that the action of state offi-
cials cannot properly be regarded as a "contract, combination, or
conspiracy," pursuant to the Sherman Act, because that phrase
contemplates only "private persons, individual or corporate."7 Sec-
ondly, the Court stated that the Sherman Act was not intended to
11 373 U.S. at 142.
" Id. at 141, citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
317 U.S. 341 (1943).
" "State action" as used in the context of Parker should not be confused with the
meaning which this term has acquired in contexts such as the interpretation of the equal
protection clause of the United States Constitution.
1, 317 U.S. at 350.
1976]
The University of Chicago Law Review
"restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by
its legislature."8 With respect to the first level of analysis, Parker
seems merely to delimit the class of persons against whom an action
based on the Sherman Act may be directed. In other words, the
Court meant simply that state officials cannot be sued, as can pri-
vate individuals, under the Sherman Act. Insofar as Rules II and
III do not purport to authorize prosecution of state officials, the
preemptive power of the rules remains intact under this interpreta-
tion.
By the broader interpretation, however, Parker has been under-
stood to foreclose antitrust prosecution of many actions mandated
by state law, regardless of whether such actions are undertaken by
private individuals, as in the nondisclosure of drug prices, rather
than by state officials." But this broader and, for the FTC, more
threatening interpretation of Parker cannot stand unqualified, for
the Court noted expressly that "a state does not give immunity to
those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate
it."2 The threshold question, left open by Parker, is what if any
state-authorized private activities are sufficiently intrinsic to the
state to render antitrust scrutiny of such activities an impermissible
restraint on "state action." The answer to this question calls for an
analysis of the applicability of the Parker doctrine to the Federal
Trade Commission Act and an examination of what constitutes
state action for purposes of the doctrine.
1. The Applicability of Parker v. Brown to the Federal Trade
Commission Act. Although few courts have considered the question
whether the Parker doctrine, which was established in the context
of the Sherman Act, operates to immunize activities prosecuted
under the Federal Trade Commission Act, the probable answer is
affirmative both in principle and according to precedent. 3
0 Id. at 350-51.
81 See generally Donnem, Federal Antitrust Law Versus Anticompetitive State
Regulations, 39 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 950 (1970); Jacobs, State Regulation and the Federal
Antitrust Laws, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 221 (1975); Kirkpatrick, The State Action Antitrust
Immunity Defense, 23 AM. U.L. REv. 527 (1974); Posner, The Proper Relationship Between
State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust Laws, 49 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 693 (1974); Simmons &
Fornaciari, State Regulation as an Antitrust Defense: An Analysis of the Parker v. Brown
Doctrine, U. CIN. L. REv. 61 (1974); Slater, Antitrust and Government Action: A Formula
for Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 71 (1974); Note, Of Raisins and Mush-
rooms: Applying the Parker Exemption, 58 VA. L. REV. 1511 (1972).
82 317 U.S. at 351.
Also supporting this conclusion are the text and legislative history upon which the
Parker Court ostensibly relied in concluding that the Sherman Act was not intended to
"restrain a state . . . from activities directed by its legislature." Like the Sherman Act, the
Federal Trade Commission Act (1) is addressed only to "persons, partnerships and
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In Asheville Tobacco Board of Trade, Inc. v. FTC,84 the relevant
question was whether the allegedly anticompetitive regulations
adopted by a local trade board were exempt from FTC prosecution
under Parker. The case is noteworthy because the court assumed
that the Parker doctrine applied to the Federal Trade Commission
Act. 5 This assumption was apparently shared by the Fourth Circuit
in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,8 which concluded in dictum:
"The Asheville case involved the Federal Trade Commission Act
instead of the Sherman Act, the latter being the controlling statute
in Parker . . . [therefore] it appears that the [Parker] exemption
can be applied regardless of the specific antitrust law involved.""
While this broad proposition, if true, indicates that the FTC cannot
dismiss out of hand the applicability of Parker to Rules II and HI,
the more difficult question is the extent to which the Asheville court
would have considered the FTC subject to Parker if the FTC's pros-
ecution were premised, not upon a strictly "anticompetitive" theory
analogous to the Sherman Act, but rather upon an "unfair act or
practice" theory, as it is in proposed Rules II and III.
In Asheville, the question as phrased by the court was whether
the trade board's regulations constituted "unfair methods of compe-
tition and unfair acts or practices . . .within the meaning of the
Federal Trade Commission Act."8 The court failed to distinguish
between an "unfair method of competition" and an "unfair act or
practice"; instead, it apparently merged the two, or more accurately
subsumed the latter phrase within the former, such that "unfair act
or practice" bore no autonomous meaning for the court.
corporations." §§ 203(a)-(b), U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2551
(1974); and (2) "gives no hint of a purpose to restrain state action in the Act's legislative
history." 317 U.S. at 351.
Notwithstanding these indicia of legislative intent, the only pre-Parker court faced with
a preemption situation approved preemption without apparent qualification. Chamber of
Commerce of Minneapolis v. FTC, 13 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1926). Here the FTC had sought to
prohibit certain allegedly anticompetitive practices compelled by rules adopted by a local
Chamber of Commerce. The defendant Chamber defended on the grounds that the adoption
of said rules was authorized by state statute. The court, though refusing to find the instant
practices anticompetitive, stated in dicta that "Congress, in the Federal Trade Commission
Act, has assumed to legislate concerning 'unfair methods of competition' . . . and if any
action by, or any rule . . . of the Chamber has that effect it is certainly subject to the Act,
no matter what the state has or has not authorized or permitted in that respect. Any action
by the state legislature . . . falls blunted if it strikes at this power which Congress vested
. ..in the Commission." Id. at 684.
- 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959).
u The court ultimately refused to apply Parker in this case, but only because the tobacco
board's regulations were found not to be within the scope of state action.
" 497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
, Id. at 7 n.15.
" 263 F.2d at 505.
1976]
The University of Chicago Law Review
On the basis of this analysis, the argument could be advanced
that the Asheville court was willing to subject the Federal Trade
Commission Act to Parker only because the Act was being invoked
against what the court correctly perceived to be a "merely" Sher-
man Act-type violation ("unfair method of competition") and that
the nondisclosure of drug prices, as an "unfair act or practice,"
involves a greater social harm-widespread injury to consum-
ers-than did the merely Sherman Act-type violation in Asheville.
In other words, as a matter of public policy an "unfair act or prac-
tice" such as nondisclosure is less deserving of Parker immunity
than an "unfair method of competition," because the former is more
detrimental to society at large and less offset by state interests in
preserving the act or practice.
The initial problem with this argument is that the Asheville
court, which hinted at no such distinction, seems to stand for the
general proposition that the FTC is not significantly different from
the Sherman Act for Parker purposes. But more fundamentally, the
argument is belied by the legislative history of the Wheeler-Lea
Amendments. The Senate Report indicates that the term "unfair
act or practice" was added primarily as a strategic means of retain-
ing FTC jurisdiction over an act otherwise culpable as an "unfair
method of competition." The Report stated:
Under the present Act, it has been intimated in court decisions
that the Commission may lose jurisdiction, of a case of decep-
tive or similar unfair acts. Under the proposed amendment, the
Commission would have jurisdiction to stop the exploitation or
deception of the public, even though the competitors of the
respondent are themselves entitled to no protection because of
their engaging in similar practices."
This statement implies that the phrase "unfair act or practice" was
not intended to proscribe conduct that was necessarily any more
injurious to consumers or less worthy of state protection than "un-
fair methods of competition.""0
" S. REP. No. 221, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1937); 83 CONG. REC. 3255 (1938) (remarks of
Senator Wheeler); id. at 391-92 (1938) (remarks of Representative Lea).
"* The Senate Report has not, of course, constrained the courts to confine the definition
of "unfair act or practice" to practices that are otherwise culpable as "unfair methods of
competition" but for the fact that respondent's competitors are engaging in similar practices.
See text at notes 16-21 supra. But what remains true about the judicial definition of "unfair
act or practice" is its frequent overlap with that of "unfair method of competition"; and the
social and economic consequences attaching to the practices comprised by each are not rigidly
distinguishable. In this connection the FTC has conceded that the nondisclosure of prescrip-
tion drug prices constitutes an "unfair method of competition" as well as an "unfair act or
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Another argument91 by which the FTC seeks to evade the impli-
cation of Asheville is even more basic, but no more persuasive, than
the distinction between "unfair acts or practices" and "unfair meth-
ods of competition." The argument is simply that Asheville was
wrong in applying Parker to the FTC Act at all, even if the grounds
for prosecution in Asheville were limited to the "unfair method of
competition" portion of the Act. This is because the phrase "unfair
method of competition" embraces, and was intended to embrace, a
broader range of conduct than the Sherman Act.
That the FTC Act is broader in scope than the Sherman Act is
well established,92 but hardly in itself a compelling reason to insu-
late the FTC from Parker. The argument would be stronger if, at
the least, the conduct proscribed by the FTC Act which is not also
proscribed by the Sherman Act was somehow more deserving of
prosecution or less worthy of state protection than conduct pro-
scribed commonly by both; and, assuming this, that the nondisclo-
sure of drug prices constituted conduct over which only the FTC has
jurisdiction. The FTC has failed to demonstrate or claim either of
these propositions. Both are doubtful,93 particularly the first. 4
The weakness of the FTC argument that the Parker doctrine
should not be applied to the FTC Act is also illustrated by the
Supreme Court decision in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,5 which
involved the Sherman Act. Here the Court apparently felt no com-
punction about applying Parker" to an antitrust activity which was
scarcely less injurious to consumers or otherwise less deserving of
prosecution than the nondisclosure of prescription drug prices. The
activity in question was the implementation of a minimum fee
practice." STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 320g. "So as to avoid any collateral problems
associated with conducting a rulemaking proceeding to address an unfair method of competi-
tion, [the FTC] Staff recommends proceeding against the offenses only as "unfair acts or
practices." Id. This apparent attempt to circumvent Parker by manipulating legal
nomenclature is not bound to succeed so long as it rests on a distinction which makes no
difference. Compare Rosten v. FTC, 263 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1959) (unfair act or practice), with
Lichtenstein v. FTC, 194 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1952) (unfair act or practice), and Lane v. FTC,
130 F.2d 48 (9th Cir. 1942) (unfair methods of competition and unfair and deceptive acts and
practices), and Carter Carburetor Corp. v. FTC, 112 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1940) (unfair method
of competition), and National Candy Co. v. FTC, 104 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1939) (unfair method
of competition).
" See STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 518.
32 FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948); FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S.
304 (1934); FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
3 As evidence of the unreliability of the second proposition, see note 19 supra.
, FrC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 694 (1948).
" 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
As in Asheville, the Court declined to grant the Parker exemption, but on grounds
unrelated to the type or quantum of injury caused by the unlawful activity.
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schedule for attorneys by state and county bar associations. The
Court was not oblivious to the injurious impact of this activity on
consumers; in fact, it was acutely aware of the injury because
Goldfarb was a class action in which consumers were represented.
As the Court noted, "[p]etitioners clearly proved that the fee
schedule . . . 'deprive[d] purchasers and consumers of the advan-
tages which they derive from competition.'97 .. .[I]n terms of...
harming consumers like petitioners the price-fixing activities found
here are unusually damaging."98
2. The Exemption of State-Authorized Nondisclosure. Since
the Federal Trade Commission Act is vulnerable to the Parker doc-
trine, the question remains whether the state-authorized nondisclo-
sure of prescription drug prices is exempt as "state action" and
therefore irreconcilable with FTC displacement of state disclosure
laws. The Goldfarb case99 bears heavily on this question. The
Goldfarb Court stated broadly that the proper inquiry for determin-
ing if an activity is exempt as state action is "whether the activity
is required by the state acting as sovereign." ' It held that neither
'7 421 U.S. at 785.
, Id. at 782.
Goldfarb is the only recent Supreme Court application of Parker. See Continental Ore
Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert
Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951), discussed at note 104 infra.
,01 421 U.S. at 790. Prompted by the elaborate analysis of the "state action" exemption
in Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047
(1972) (permitting antitrust action against District of Columbia governmental authority act-
ing under federal act and indicating in dictum that result would be the same for state
governmental authority acting under state law), much of the recent commentary on Parker
v. Brown has sought to prescribe a stricter test for the exemption than that of merely
"whether the activity is required by the state acting as sovereign." See, e.g., Baker v. Mayor
& City Council of Baltimore, 1967 TRADE CAS. 72,004 (Baltimore City, Md., Cir. Ct. 1967),
remanded without affirmance or reversal sub nom. A & H Transp., Inc. v. Mayor & City
Council of Baltimore, 249 Md. 518, 240 A.2d 601 (1968) (probably the only decided case which
apparently employed the stricter test); authorities cited note 81 supra; Note, Parker v.
Brown: A Preemption Analysis, 84 YALE L.J. 1164 (1975). The essence of this test, in all its
variations, is that the state action must be "consistent" with some auxiliary antitrust policy
(or perhaps any federal law, antitrust or not) in order to obtain the Parker exemption. "Where
the various goals of the federal antitrust laws cannot be simultaneously achieved, so that a
choice among them is necessary, the decision by a state to effectuate one of the recognized
federal policies should not be considered inconsistent with paramount federal law." Id. at
1171. Thus, as the most prominent example, a private natural monopoly under active state
superintendence might be said to ensure allocative efficiency and adequate profitability.
Business Aids, Inc. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 480 F.2d 754 (4th Cir. 1973);
Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971); Washington Gas Light
Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971); Alabama Power Co. v.
Alabama Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 394 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1968); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier,
361 F.2d 870 (4th Cir. 1966). Contra, Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
See generally Hale & Hale, The Otter Tail Power Case: Regulation by Commission or Anti-
trust Laws, 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 99. The test frequently derives its preliminary justification
FTC Drug Price Disclosure Regulation
the state nor the county bar association was exempt under Parker,
upon finding that neither had been required by state law to issue
fee schedules.'"' By strong implication,'02 however, the Court would
have granted a state action exemption upon such a showing not only
to the state bar (a state agency) but also to the bar association,
which the Court recognized to be a private non-governmental organ-
ization.1 3 The Court seemed amenable to extending Parker
by reference to the rather inconspicuous acknowledgement in Parker that the state action in
that case was consistent with the Agricultural Adjustment Act. 317 U.S. at 352-59. But see
Handler, Twenty-Fourth Annual Antitrust Review, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1972); Pogue, The
Rationale of Exemptions from Antitrust, 19 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 313, 324 (1961). Even
if plausible on more fundamental federalism grounds, the test would not undermine the
status of state-authorized nondisclosure as a state action inasmuch as nondisclosure can in
some sense be viewed as a means of preserving small competitors. Interview with Fred E.
Schwartz, Executive Director of the Illinois Pharmaceutical Ass'n, Jan. 8, 1976. Reviewing
courts are likely to be sensitive to this antitrust policy because the Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act specifically provides that any promulgated Trade Regulation Rule must be
accompanied by a statement taking into account the impact of the rule on small businesses.
U.S. CODE, CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2534 (1974). See generally Bork,
Bowman, Blake & Jones, Goals of Antitrust-A Dialogue on Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363
(1965).
The most radical version of the stricter test for applying Parker hinges precariously on
the fact that the Agricultural Adjustment Act provided that "[tihe making of any . . .
[approved marketing] agreement shall not be held to be in violation of any of the antitrust
laws of the United States" (7 U.S.C. § 608(b) (1970)); accordingly, Parker should be limited
to state actions protected by an express antitrust exception included in a federal law. Jacobs,
State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust Laws, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 221, 247 (1975).
The Parker Court neither relied on nor even mentioned the foregoing exception.
The cogent objection to the judicially evolved Parker doctrine is not that it simply
contradicts the two-tier federal system by denying federal supremacy over state law-even
the staunchest proponents of federal supremacy concede that states enjoy some discrete
regulatory power over activities within the state, and Parker itself emphasized that an unex-
pressed intent to displace state regulations is not to be lightly attributed to Congress. 317
U.S. 341, 351 (1943). Rather, the objection is that the doctrine creates an anomalous situation
by exempting from antitrust prosecution activities which, if privately arranged, would be
subject to prosecution but for the mere fact of sufficient state participation. This anomaly is
said to be satisfactorily reconciled by the limiting principle, as yet unadopted by the courts,
that Parker should apply only when the state authorization of the private activity in question
can be said to rest on a policy which comports with some antitrust goal and which therefore
is not to be second-guessed by the judiciary.
The limiting principle merely limits arbitrarily rather than resolves the ostensible anom-
aly which Parker creates, for activities which retain Parker immunity under the limiting
principle might be just as subject to prosecution, if privately arranged, as those activities
which do not. To draw a line between antitrust consistency and inconsistency is to imply that
state legislatures are entitled to more respect when authorizing an unlawful private activity
which exhibits such consistency, as compared with an unlawful private activity which does
not. The legislative wisdom of authorizing an otherwise unlawful activity does not necessarily
bear any relation to the question of antitrust consistency or inconsistency.
, 421 U.S. at 790.
' Id. at 788.
10 Id. at 790.
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immunity to private parties "compelled by the direction of the
State,"'"4 and in this regard it hastened to reaffirm its respect for
"the authority of the State to regulate its professions."''
Applying the Goldfarb standard for state action to the nondis-
closure of prescription drug prices yields a finding of state action in
most, but not necessarily all instances of nondisclosure induced by
state law. When the state law involved is statutory, as it was in
Parker, the Goldfarb standard is plainly satisfied;"6 but when the
law involved is merely a state pharmacy board regulation, then the
presence of state action is less pronounced. Without exception, no
pharmacy board regulation that restricts price disclosure is specifi-
cally authorized by a state legislature. Rather, the legislative grant
of power is drafted broadly to permit such regulations "as may be
necessary for the protection of the public" or "necessary and expedi-
ent for the practice of pharmacy."'' 7 Therefore, nondisclosure in-
duced by pharmacy board regulations cannot be said to have been
directly compelled by the legislative command of the state.
Since a legislature can delegate authority broadly without spe-
ll' "In Parker v. Brown [citation], the Court held that an anticompetitive marketing
program which 'derived its authority and efficacy from the legislative command of the state'
was not a violation of the Sherman Act because the Act was intended to regulate private
practices and not prohibit a State from imposing a restraint as an act of government." 421
U.S. at 788. "It is not enough that, as the County Bar puts it, [the County Bar's] anticompe-
titive conduct [was] 'prompted' by state action; rather, anticompetitive activities must be
compelled by direction of the State .... " Id. at 791; cf. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert
Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951), which is not fundamentally inconsistent with the forth-
right Goldfarb statements. Here the state of Louisiana required that all liquor retailers having
knowledge of a minimum price agreement between the liquor distributor and any one retailer
not sell liquor at a price less than the minimum price established by that agreement. The
Court, in refusing to enforce the state law, stated that "when a state compels retailers to
follow a parallel price policy, it demands private conduct which the Sherman Act forbids.
See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350." 341 U.S. at 389. The FTC has underscored this
statement to support the blanket proposition that Parker does not exempt from antitrust
prosecution private retailers, such as retail pharmacists, whose conduct is compelled by state
law. STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 535. But the problem with this argument is that the
Schwegmann decision rested on a specific determination that Congress, in the Miller-Tydings
Act, which authorized state "price-fixing" laws otherwise, had "meticulously omitted" ap-
proval of the price-fixing scheme at bar. 341 U.S. at 388. Thus the Court was confronted with
what it understood to be a specific congressional refusal to authorize the private conduct
which the state law sought to compel. It did not indicate that where, as in the case of drug
price nondisclosure, no direct congressional disapproval of state laws compelling the private
conduct is evident, the Parker exemption cannot obtain. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. at
350.
... 421 U.S. at 793.
,o Id. at 788.
o See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2851(1) (1965); Miss. CODE ANN. § 73-21-13 (1973);
N.Y. CONSOL. LAWS ANN. § 6804(a) (McKinney 1972); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-19-6 (Supp. 1974).
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cific guidelines,"8 the lack of a direct legislative command with
respect to nondisclosure of drug prices is not dispositive. Thus, the
Goldfarb Court pursued the question of state action even after de-
termining that no statute had compelled the respondents' activities
directly; it specifically asked if the Virginia Supreme Court, in its
capacity as "agency" of the state by virtue of broad legislative dele-
gation, had mandated the fee schedules. This question presumably
would not have been asked unless an affirmative answer were ger-
mane to its determination of state action."9 But the Court's ap-
proval of delegation for Parker purposes is not dispositive of the
nondisclosure issue. The more telling question is whether the
Goldfarb Court would have respected the directive of a state phar-
macy board regulation in the same manner that it was willing to
respect a directive by the Virginia Supreme Court. Both "agencies,"
it is true, had the power to compel private activity pursuant to
broad legislative delegation. But the important distinction is that a
state pharmacy board is composed primarily of independent retail
pharmacists"0 whose motives for promulgating anti-disclosure regu-
lations are considerably more susceptible to self-interest. The infer-
ence arises that such regulations may be the result, not of state
action, but of "individual action masquerading as state action""'
and thus are not at the direction of the state "acting as a sover-
eign. 112 The Goldfarb Court was aware of this possibility, and noted
that "[t]he fact that the State Bar is a state agency for some
limited purposes does not create an antitrust shield that allows it
to foster anticompetitive practices for the benefit of its members.""'
In Goldfarb, however, the "masquerading" state agency was itself
the subject of liability, whereas in the state pharmacy board situa-
tion, liability would attach only to innocent pharmacists complying
with the board's ostensibly valid regulations. Goldfarb ultimately
provides little clear indication of how the Court would decide under
such circumstances.
3. Status of Individual Action Under State-Authorized
Nondisclosure. Once it has been determined that the Parker doc-
trine prevents the FTC from displacing state statutory nondisclo-
' K. DAvIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 2.05 (1972).
421 U.S. at 790.
"' State pharmacy statutes frequently provide for the appointment of state trade asso-
ciation members to the state board. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.20 (1972); KANSAS STAT.
ANN. § 74-1605 (1972). See also F. FLETCHER, MARKET RESTRAINTS IN THE RETAIL DRUG
INDUSTRY 45-49 (1967).
' Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. FTC, 263 F.2d 502, 509 (4th Cir. 1959).
"' 421 U.S. at 791.
113 Id.
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sure rules, the status of individuals and private organizations must
be determined. Given a valid state law prohibiting disclosure, it
would be both illogical and unjust to allow the FTC to prosecute an
individual for following the law; however, it is not clear whether the
prosecution should be barred with respect to the rules of a private
pharmaceutical association.
In California ex rel. Christensen v. FTC,14 a district court
granted the State of California a preliminary injunction to prevent
the FTC from proceeding against the California Milk Producers
Board (a state agency) and an advertising agency (a private
corporation) for the alleged dissemination of deceptive advertise-
ments. Citing Parker, the court stated:
There is a substantial probability that: (1) there is not jurisdic-
tion in the Federal Trade Commission to proceed against the
State of California, its instrumentalities, its agencies, or its
officers in their official capacities [citation omitted]; and (2)
the FTC may not avoid this fact by seeking to proceed instead
against a private corporation. . . aiding the State in carrying
out the conduct in question.15
If the permanent injunction and declaratory judgment sought in
this case are granted specifically with reference to protection of the
private corporation, the Christensen case promises to go further
than any other in applying the Parker doctrine to the FTC."'
What is left unclear by the Christensen court is the extent to
which private corporations are to be protected. If, as the court sug-
gested, Parker should immunize all private parties who can be said
to be "aiding" the state, there seems to be little reason to conclude
that "aiding" the state is limited to include only those private par-
ties "employed" by the state.117 The Parker exemption as applied
' 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1974-2 Trade Cas.) 75,328 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 1974).
Its Id. at 98,039.
"I The nature of the FTC's formal complaint in Christensen was not disclosed, but likely
included, as do most FTC complaints, both the "unfair method of competition" and the
"unfair or deceptive act or practice" ascriptions.
The formal nature of the complaint should not be relevant to the applicability of
Christensen to the FTC Rules; Christensen would be no less significant precedentially, there-
fore, if the complaint in that case were not grounded, like the Rules, on a strict "unfair act
or practice" theory. This may be discerned from the fact that the court's apparent rationale
for extending Parker) to the FTC Act was unrelated to any one specific form of complaint.
Rather, the court addressed itself to the Act as a whole: "[N]either the FTC Act nor its
legislative history indicates that states, state agencies, state instrumentalities, or state offi-
cers in their official capacities were intended by Congress to be included within the terms
'persons, partnerships, or corporations.'" 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1974-2 Trade Cas.) 75,328,
at 98,039 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 1974).
M1 The only policy consideration which distinguishes this narrow construction is the
undesirability of discouraging private contractors from entering into government contracts for
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in Christensen would seem, like Goldfarb, to include pharmacists
acting under compulsion of state law in violation of Rules II and 1II,
at least when the state law is statutory. Furthermore, "aiding" the
state might also be construed even more broadly to include any
private parties who are furthering specific ends of the state with its
approval. By this construction, Christensen would immunize not
only pharmacists compelled by valid state law to violate Rules II or
Ill, but also private pharmaceutical associations that violate Rule I
by seeking to deter pharmacists from disclosing."'
A third possible construction of Christensen is that Parker
immunizes any private party whose prosecution by the FTC is re-
garded by the reviewing court as a merely circuitous attempt by the
FTC to reach the state itself. This broad construction seems justi-
fied by the desirability of discouraging the FTC from seeking to
aggrandize its jurisdiction by prosecuting states indirectly. This
policy is a fortiori when, as in the drug price disclosure situation,
the private activity involves no autonomous culpability; that is,
whereas the advertising agency in Christensen would still be guilty
of the alleged deception had its actions not been at the behest of the
state milk producers board, a retail pharmacist whose failure to
disclose was not at the behest of state law would not be guilty of an
unfair act or practice, unless of course some extralegal restraint
were involved.
The uncertain scope of Christensen is only partly elucidated by
E. W. Wiggens Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Authority,"'
which the Christensen court cited to support its extension of
Parker to private parties. In Wiggens, the defendant port author-
ity, a state agency, entered into an allegedly anticompetitive leas-
ing agreement with a private corporation whereby the latter would
function as the exclusive fixed base operator at Logan Airport.
Following a typical state action inquiry, the court initially held that
the port authority, in entering into the agreement, was acting pur-
suant to legislative mandate and was therefore exempt from anti-
trust prosecution under Parker. More significantly, the court then
held that the private corporation was also exempt, stating that
"[ilf, as we have found, the Authority's conduct was lawful here it
fear that, if immunity were extended only to government agencies and not to their contrac-
tors, agencies would be encouraged to disregard FTC law in designing assignments for con-
tractors, thus exposing the contractors themselves to prosecution. But this policy, while
plausible, was evidently not considered by the Christensen court and, even if considered,
would not be dispositive.
"I Private pharmaceutical associations, however, could not be said to have "aided" the
state except where the state has a disclosure statute.
1' 362 F.2d 52 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966).
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would be an unreasonable restriction on its freedom to hold that
[the private defendant] acted illegally in having aided it.'12o The
court thus suggested that private parties can be regarded as "aid-
ing" a state, and are therefore exempt from prosecution, when such
prosecution would constitute an "unreasonable restriction" of the
state's "freedom" to act pursuant to a legislative mandate.
This holding, like that in Christensen, tolerates the extension
of Parker to nondisclosing pharmacists acting under compulsion of
state law, in that FTC prosecution would operate as an obvious
restriction on the state's freedom to enforce its disclosure laws. The
additional term "reasonable" does not seem to undermine this con-
clusion, assuming (as did the Wiggens court) the validity of the
state law in question. In Wiggens, of course, as in Christensen, the
relationship of the private party to the state, unlike that of retail
pharmacists, was contractual. But this fact seemed merely inciden-
tal, as it did in Christensen, for the court's emphasis was on the fact
of imposition on the prerogatives of the state. It can hardly be sug-
gested that the imposition in Wiggens was greater than it would be
if disclosure laws were involved: a state's freedom to execute a law
authorizing a port authority to "operate and manage"121 a particular
airport is presumably no less deserving of preservation than its free-
dom to enforce a law prohibiting drug price disclosure. In fact, the
former is a weaker case, at least when the disclosure law involved
is a statute rather than a pharmacy board regulation, because the
statute in Wiggens did not specifically authorize any sort of leasing
agreement or fixed base operation, whereas disclosure statutes man-
ifestly authorize the prosecution of pharmacists for engaging in
specified disclosure activity.12 2 To the extent, then, that Wiggens
may be taken to circumscribe the Christensen rationale,
Christensen seems to preclude FTC displacement through proposed
Rules II and II. 123
CONCLUSION
The proposed FTC regulation of prescription drug price disclo-
sure by retail pharmacists is legally suspect and not likely to with-
stand judicial review unimpeached. The Parker doctrine, although
traditionally invoked in the Sherman Act context, will almost cer-
,20 Id. at 56.
121 Id. at 55.
' See note 5 supra.
' Rule I, however, seems to remain intact, in that a state's freedom to enforce disclosure
laws would not be "unreasonably restricted" by FTC prosecution of private pharmaceutical
associations as mandated by that Rule.
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tainly invalidate Rules II and III to the extent that they purport to
displace state disclosure statutes and, possibly, pharmacy board
regulations. The mandatory disclosure provisions contained in
Rules II and III strain the theory of deception upon which estab-
lished FTC disclosure remedies are typically based, but deserve
serious judicial attention as a remedy against unfairness, apart from
deception. Given a preliminary finding that nondisclosure is unfair,
therefore, the FTC should be able to compel disclosure, pursuant to
Rule III, in those states without disclosure laws and prohibit private
restraints pursuant to Rule I and deference thereto pursuant to
Rule II. The theory of unfairness, conceptually amorphous and
largely unutilized in the past, could serve not only as the rationale
for increasing consumer access to prescription drug price informa-
tion but as a potent means of establishing the FTC-with its
healthy budget, professionalized staff, and relative unsusceptibility
to privately vested commercial influences-as a genuinely national
instrument of consumer protection.
Ronald B. Shwartz
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